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Abstract—Wyner’s work on wiretap channels and the recent
works on information theoretic security are based on random
codes. Achieving information theoretical security with practical
coding schemes is of definite interest. In this note, the attempt
is to overcome this elusive task by employing the polar coding
technique of Arıkan. It is shown that polar codes achieve non-
trivial perfect secrecy rates for binary-input degraded wiretap
channels while enjoying their low encoding-decoding complexity.
In the special case of symmetric main and eavesdropper chan-
nels, this coding technique achieves the secrecy capacity. Next,
fading erasure wiretap channels are considered and a secret key
agreement scheme is proposed, which requires only the statistical
knowledge of the eavesdropper channel state information (CSI).
The enabling factor is the creation of advantage over Eve,
by blindly using the proposed scheme over each fading block,
which is then exploited with privacy amplification techniques to
generate secret keys.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy was introduced
by Shannon to study secure communication over point-to-point
noiseless channels [1]. This line of work was later extended
by Wyner [2] to noisy channels. Wyner’s degraded wiretap
channel assumes that the eavesdropper channel is a degraded
version of the one seen by the legitimate receiver. Under this
assumption, Wyner showed that the advantage of the main
channel over that of the eavesdropper, in terms of the lower
noise level, can be exploited to transmit secret bits using
random codes. This keyless secrecy result was then extended
to a more general (broadcast) model in [3] and to the Gaussian
setting in [4]. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in
wireless physical layer security (see, e.g., Special Issue on
Information Theoretic Security, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, June
2008 and references therein). However, designing practical
codes to achieve secrecy for any given main and eavesdropper
channels remained as an elusive task.
In [5], the authors constructed LDPC based wiretap codes
for certain binary erasure channel (BEC) and binary symmetric
channel (BSC) scenarios. In particular, when the main channel
is noiseless and the eavesdropper channel is a BEC, [5]
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presented codes that approach secrecy capacity. For other
scenarios, secrecy capacity achieving code design is stated
as an open problem. Similarly, [6] considers the design of
secure nested codes for the noiseless main channel setting (see
also [7]).
This work considers secret communication over a binary-
input degraded wiretap channel. Using the polar coding tech-
nique of Arıkan [8], we show that non-trivial secrecy rates
are achievable. According to our best knowledge, this coding
technique is the first provable and practical (having low en-
coding and decoding complexity) secrecy encoding technique
for this set of channels. In the special case of the symmetric
main and eavesdropper channels, this technique achieves the
secrecy capacity of the channel 1. Next, we consider fading
wiretap channels and propose a key agreement scheme where
the users only assumed to have the statistical knowledge of
the eavesdropper CSI. The enabling observation is that by
blindly using the scheme over many fading blocks, the users
will eventually create an advantage over Eve, which can then
be exploited to generate secret keys using privacy amplification
techniques.
II. NOTATIONS
Throughout this paper, vectors are denoted by xN1 =
{x1, · · · , xN} or by x¯ if we omit the indices. Random
variables are denoted with capital letters X , which are defined
over sets denoted by the calligraphic letters X . For a given set
A ⊂ {1, · · · , N}, we write xA to denote the sub-vector {xi :
i ∈ A}. Omitting the random variables, we use the following
shorthand for probability distributions p(x) , Pr(X = x),
p(x|y) , Pr(X = x|Y = y).
III. POLAR CODES
Consider a binary-input DMC (B-DMC) given by W (y|x),
where x ∈ X = {0, 1} and y ∈ Y for some finite set Y . The
N uses of W is denoted by WN (yN1 |xN1 ). The symmetric
1We acknowledge that the concurrent work [9] independently established
the result that polar codes can achieve the secrecy capacity of the degraded
wiretap channels, when both main and eavesdropper channels are binary-input
and symmetric (Corollary 7 of this note).
capacity of a B-DMC W is given by
I(W ) ,
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
1
2
W (y|x) log2

 W (y|x)∑
x′∈X
1
2W (y|x
′)

 , (1)
which is the mutual information I(X ;Y ) when the input X
is uniformly distributed. The Bhattacharyya parameter of W
is given by
Z(W ) ,
∑
y∈Y
√
W (y|0)W (y|1), (2)
which measures the reliability of W as it is an upper bound
on the probability of ML decision error on a single use of the
channel.
Polar codes is recently introduced by Arıkan [8]. These
codes can be encoded and decoded with complexity
O(N logN), while achieving an overall block-error proba-
bility that is bounded as O(2−Nβ ) for any fixed β < 12
([8], [10]). In [8], channel polarization is used to construct
codes (polar codes) that can achieve the symmetric capacity,
I(W ), of any given B-DMC W . Channel polarization consists
of two operations: Channel combining and channel splitting.
Let uN1 be the vector to be transmitted. The combined channel
is represented by WN and is given by
WN (y
N
1 |u
N
1 ) = W
N (yN1 |u
N
1 BNF
⊗n), (3)
where BN is a bit-reversal permutation matrix, N = 2n, and
F ,
(
1 0
1 1
)
. Note that the actual channel input here is
given by xN1 = uN1 BNF⊗n. The channel splitting constructs
N binary input channels from WN , where the transformation
is given by
W
(i)
N (y
N
1 , u
i−1
1 |ui) ,
∑
uN
i+1∈X
N−i
1
2N−1
WN (y
N
1 |u
N
1 ). (4)
The polarization phenomenon is shown by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 of [8]): For any B-DMC W , N =
2n for some n, and δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
lim
N→∞
|{i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : I(W
(i)
N ) ∈ (1− δ, 1]}|
N
= I(W ),
lim
N→∞
|{i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : I(W
(i)
N ) ∈ [0, δ)}|
N
= 1− I(W ).
In order to derive the rate of the channel polarization, the
random process Zn is defined in [8] and in [10]. Basically,
Pr{Zn ∈ (a, b)} =
|{i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(W
(i)
2n ) ∈ (a, b)}|
N
(5)
The rate of the channel polarization is given by the following.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1 of [10]): For any B-DMC W and
for any given β < 12 ,
lim
n→∞
Pr{Zn < 2−2
nβ
} = I(W ).
Now, the idea of polar coding is clear. The encoder-decoder
pair, utilizing the polarization effect, will transmit data through
the subchannels for which Z(W (i)N ) is near 0. In [8], the
polar code (N,K,A, uAc) for B-DMC W is defined by
xN1 = u
N
1 BNF
⊗n
, where uAc is a given frozen vector, and
the information set A is chosen such that |A| = K and
Z(W
(i)
N ) < Z(W
(j)
N ) for all i ∈ A, j ∈ Ac. The frozen vector
uAc is given to the decoder. Arıkan’s successive cancellation
(SC) estimates the input as follows: For the frozen indices
uˆAc = uAc . For the remaining indices s.t. i ∈ A; uˆi = 0, if
W
(i)
N (y
N
1 , uˆ
i−1
1 |0) ≥W
(i)
N (y
N
1 , uˆ
i−1
1 |1) and uˆi = 1, otherwise.
With this decoder, it is shown in [8] that the average block
error probability over the ensemble (consisting of all possible
frozen vector choices) of polar codes is bounded by
Pe(N) ≤
∑
i∈A
Z(W
(i)
N ).
We now state the result of [8] using the bound given in [10].
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2 of [10]): For any given B-DMC W
with I(W ) > 0, let R < I(W ) and β ∈ (0, 12 ) be fixed. Block
error probability for polar coding under SC decoding (averaged
over possible choices of frozen vectors) satisfies
Pe(N) = O(2
−Nβ ).
Note that, for any given β ∈ (0, 12 ) and ǫ > 0, we can
define the sequence of polar codes by choosing the information
indices as
AN = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(W
(i)
N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β
}.
Then, from the above theorems, for sufficiently large N , we
can achieve the rate
R =
|AN |
N
≥ I(W )− ǫ
with average block error probability (averaged over the possi-
ble choices of uAc
N
)
Pe(N) ≤
∑
i∈AN
Z(W
(i)
N ) ≤ 2
−Nβ
under SC decoding. (See also [11].)
This result shows the existence of a polar code
(N,K,A, uAc) achieving the symmetric capacity of W . We
remark that, any frozen vector choice of uAc will work for
symmetric channels [8]. For our purposes, we will denote a
polar code for B-DMC W with C(N,F , uF), where the frozen
set is given by F , Ac. Note that, A denotes the indices of
information transmission for the polar code, whereas F is the
set of frozen indices.
We conclude this section by noting the following lemma
(given in [11]) regarding polar coding over degraded channels.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 4.7 of [11]): Let W : X → Y and W ′ :
X → Y ′ be two B-DMCs such that W is degraded w.r.t. W ′,
i.e., there exists a channel W ′′ : Y ′ → Y such that
W (y|x) =
∑
y′∈Y′
W ′(y′|x)W ′′(y|y′).
Then, W (i)N is degraded w.r.t. W ′
(i)
N and Z(W
(i)
N ) ≥ Z(W
′(i)
N ).
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION OVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
A discrete memoryless wiretap channel with is denoted by
(X ,W (ym, ye|x),Ym × Ye),
for some finite sets X ,Ym,Ye. Here the symbols x ∈ X
are the channel inputs and the symbols (ym, ye) ∈ Ym × Ye
are the channel outputs observed at the main decoder and at
the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel is memoryless and
time-invariant:
p(ymi, yei|x
i
1, ym
i−1
1 , ye
i−1
1 ) =W (ymi, yei|xi).
We assume that the transmitter has a secret message M which
is to be transmitted to the receiver in N channel uses and
to be secured from the eavesdropper. In this setting, a secret
codebook has the following components:
1) The secret message set M. The transmitted messages are
assumed to be uniformly distributed over these message sets.
2) A stochastic encoding function f(.) at the transmitter
which maps the secret messages to the transmitted symbols:
f : m→ XN1 for each m ∈ M.
3) Decoding function φ(.) at receiver which maps the
received symbols to estimate of the message: φ(YmN1 ) = {mˆ}.
The reliability of transmission is measured by the following
probability of error.
Pe =
1
|M|
∑
(m)∈M
Pr
{
φ(Ym
N
1 ) 6= (m)|(m) is sent
}
We say that the rate R is an achievable secrecy rate, if, for
any given ǫ > 0, there exists a secret codebook such that,
1
N
log(|M|) = R
Pe ≤ ǫ
1
N
I
(
M ;Ye
N
1
)
≤ ǫ (6)
for sufficiently large N .
Consider a degraded binary-input wiretap channel, where,
for the input set X = {0, 1}, the main channel is given by
Wm(ym|x) (7)
and the eavesdropper channel is
We(ye|x) =
∑
ym∈Ym
Wm(ym|x)Wd(ye|ym). (8)
Here, the degradation is due to the channel Wd(ye|ym).
Note that, due to degradation, polar codes designed for the
eavesdropper channel can be used for the main channel. For
a given sufficiently large N and β ∈ (0, 12 ), let
Am = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(Wm
(i)
N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β
},
Ae = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(We
(i)
N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β
}.
Now, consider a polar code Cm , C(N,Fm, uFm) for the
main channel with some uFm . Due to Lemma 4, we have
Ae ⊂ Am and hence Fm ⊂ Fe. Now, for any given
length |Fe| − |Fm| vector v¯m and uFm , we define the
frozen vector for the eavesdropper, denoted by uFe(v¯m), by
choosing (uFe(v¯m))Fm = uFm and (uFe(v¯m))Fe\Fm = v¯m.
Note that, denoting Ce(v¯m) , C(N,Fe, uFe(v¯m)), the en-
semble ∪v¯m,uFmCe(v¯m) is a symmetric capacity achieving
polar code ensemble for the eavesdropper channel We (if
the eavesdropper channel is symmetric, any frozen vector
choice will work [8], and hence the code achieves the capacity
of the eavesdropper channel for any v¯m, uFm). This implies
that the code for the main channel can be partitioned as
Cm = ∪v¯mCe(v¯m). This observation, when considered over the
ensemble of codes, enables us to construct secrecy achieving
polar coding schemes, even if the eavesdropper channel is not
symmetric, as characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: For a binary-input degraded wiretap channel,
the perfect secrecy rate of I(Wm) − I(We) is achieved by
polar coding.
Proof:
Encoding: We map the secret message to be transmitted to
v¯m and generate a random vector v¯r, according to uniform
distribution over X , of length |Ae|. Then, the channel input
is constructed with xN1 = uN1 BNF⊗n, where uFm is the
frozen vector of the polar code Cm, uFe\Fm = v¯m, and
uAe = v¯r. The polar code ensemble is constructed over all
different choices of frozen vectors, i.e., uFm .
Decoding: The vectors v¯m and v¯r can be decoded with
the SC decoder described above with error probability Pe =
O(2−N
β
) (averaged over the ensemble) achieving a rate R =
|v¯m|
N
= I(Wm)− I(We) for sufficiently large N .
Security: Lets assume that the vector v¯m is given to
the eavesdropper along with uFm . Then, employing the SC
decoding, the eavesdropper can decode the random vector v¯r
with Pe = O(2−N
β
) averaged over the ensemble. Utilizing
the Fano’s inequality and average it over the code ensemble
seen by the Eve, i.e. over V¯m and UFm , we obtain
H(V¯r|V¯m, UFm , Ye
N
1 ) ≤ H(Pe) +N log(|X |)Pe ≤ Nǫ(N), (9)
where ǫ(N)→ 0 as N →∞.
Then, the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper
averaged over the ensemble can be bounded as follows.
I(M ;Ye
N
1 |UFm) = I(V¯m;Ye
N
1 |UFm)
= I(V¯m, V¯r ;Ye
N
1 |UFm)− I(V¯r;Ye
N
1 |V¯m, UFm) (10)
(a)
= I(UN1 ;Ye
N
1 )−H(V¯r) +H(V¯r|V¯m, UFm , Ye
N
1 )(11)
(b)
≤ I(XN1 ;Ye
N
1 )−H(V¯r) +H(V¯r|V¯m, UFm , Ye
N
1 )(12)
(c)
≤ NI(We)− |Ae|+H(V¯r|V¯m, uFm , Ye
N
1 ) (13)
(d)
≤ NI(We)− |Ae|+Nǫ(N), (14)
where in (a) we have UN1 each entry with i.i.d. uniformly
distributed, (b) follows from data processing inequality, (c) is
due to I(XN1 ;YeN1 ) =
N∑
i=1
I(XN1 ;Yei|Ye
i−1
1 ) ≤
N∑
i=1
H(Yei)−
H(Yei|Xi) = NI(Xi;Yei) with a uniformly distributed Xi,
and (d) follows from (9) with ǫ(N) → 0 as N → ∞. As
|Ae|
N
→ I(We) as N gets large, we obtain
1
N
I(V¯m;Ye
N
1 |UFm) ≤ ǫ (15)
for a given ǫ > 0 for sufficiently large N . As the reliability and
secrecy constraints are satisfied averaged over the ensemble,
there exist a polar code with some fixed uFm achieving the
secure rate I(Wm)− I(We).
Note that in the above result, the code satisfying the reliabil-
ity and the secrecy constraints can be found from the ensemble
by an exhaustive search. However, as block length increases,
almost all the codes in the ensemble will do equally well.
If the eavesdropper channel is symmetric, then the secrecy
constraint is satisfied for any given frozen vector uFm and
the code search is only for the reliability constraint. If the
eavesdropper channel is not symmetric, a prefix channel can
be utilized to have this property.
Corollary 6: For non-symmetric eavesdropper channels, the
channel can be prefixed with some p(x|x′) such that the
resulting eavesdropper channel
W ′e(ye|x
′) =
∑
ym∈Ym
p(x|x′)Wm(ym|x)Wd(ye|ym)
is symmetric. Then, using the scheme above, the secret rate
R = I(W ′m)− I(W
′
e)
is achievable, where W ′m(ym|x′) = p(x|x′)Wm(ym|x).
Finally, we note that the scheme achieves the secrecy capacity
and any code in the ensemble, i.e., any fixed uFm , will satisfy
both the reliability and secrecy constraints, if the main and
eavesdropper channels are symmetric.
Corollary 7: For a binary-input degraded wiretap channel
with symmetric main and eavesdropper channels, polar coding
achieves the secrecy capacity, i.e., C(Wm) − C(We), of the
channel.
We note that the stated results are achievable by encoders
and decoders with complexity of O(N logN) for each. In
addition, if the channels are binary erasure channels (BECs),
then there exists algorithms with complexity O(N) for the
code construction [8].
V. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER FADING WIRETAP
CHANNELS
In this section, we focus on the following key agreement
problem: Alice, over fading wiretap channel, would like to
agree on a secret key with Bob in the presence of passive
eavesdropper Eve. We focus on the special case of binary
erasure main and eavesdropper channels, for which the code
construction is shown to be simple [8].
Fading blocks are represented by i = 1, · · · , LM and each
block has N channel uses. Random variables over blocks are
represented with the following bar notation. Y¯ (l;m)e denotes
the observations of Eve over the fading block m of the super
block l, the observations of Eve over super block l ∈ [1, L]
is denoted by Y¯ (l)e = Y¯ (l;1···M)e , {Y¯ (l;1)e , · · · , Y¯ (l;M)e }, and
Eve’s total observation over all super blocks is denoted by
Y ∗e = Y¯
(1···L)
e = {Y¯
(1)
e , · · · , Y¯
(L)
e }.
Main and eavesdropper channels are binary erasure channels
and are denoted by W (i)m and W (i)e , respectively. Here, the
channels Wm and We are random, outcome of which result in
the channels of each block. Instantaneous eavesdropper CSI is
not known at the users, only the statistical knowledge of it is
assumed. The channels are assumed to be physically degraded
w.r.t. some order at each block. 2 Note that, in this setup,
eavesdropper channel can be better than the main channel on
the average.
We utilize the proposed secrecy encoding scheme for the
wiretap channel at each fading block. Omitting the block
indices, frozen and information bits are denoted as uFm and
uAm , respectively. Information bits are uniformly distributed
binary random variables and are mapped to uAm . Secret and
randomization bits among these information bits are denoted
by V¯m and V¯r , respectively. Frozen bits are provided both to
main receiver and eavesdropper at each block. (We omitted
writing this side information below as all zero vector can be
chosen as the frozen vector for the erasure channel [8].) Note
that Alice and Bob do not know the length of V¯ (i)m at fading
block i. In particular, there may not be any secured bits at a
given fading block.
Considering the resulting information accumulation over a
block, we obtain the followings.
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m ) = [C(W
(i)
m )− C(W
(i)
e )]
+
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r ) = min{C(W
(i)
m ), C(W
(i)
e )},
where the former denotes the amount of secure information
generated at block i (here the secrecy level is the bound
on the mutual information leakage rate), and the latter de-
notes the remaining information. Note that these entropies are
random variables as channels are random over the blocks.
Remarkable, this scheme converts the fading phenomenon
to the advantage of Alice and Bob (similar to the enabling
observation utilized in [12]). Exploiting this observation and
coding over LM fading blocks, the proposed scheme below
creates advantage for the main users: As L,M,N get large,
information bits, denoted by W ∗, are w.h.p. reliably decoded
at the Bob, H(W ∗)→ LMNE [C(Wm)], and H(W ∗|Y ∗e )→
LMN E [[C(Wm)− C(We)]
+]. This accomplishes both ad-
vantage distillation and information reconciliation phases of a
key agreement protocol [13], [14]. Now, a third phase (called
as privacy amplification) is needed to distill a shorter string
K from W ∗, about which Eve has only a negligible amount
of information. The privacy amplification step can be done
with universal hashing as considered in [13]. We first state the
following definitions and lemma regarding universal hashing,
and then formalize the main result of this section in the
following theorem.
2Remarkable, a random walk model with packet erasures can be covered
with this model. Also, parallel channel model is equivalent to this scenario.
Definition 8: A class G of functions A → B is universal if,
for any x1 6= x2 in A, the probability that g(x1) = g(x2) is
at most 1|B| when g is chosen as random from G according to
the uniform distribution.
There are efficient universal classes, e.g., to map n bits
to r bits, class of linear functions given by r × n matrices
needs rn bits to describe [15]. Note that hash function should
have complexity as 1) it will be revealed to each user, and 2)
Alice and Bob will compute g(W ∗). There are more efficient
classes with polynomial time evaluation complexity and O(n)
description complexity [15].
Generalized privacy amplification, proposed in [13], is
based on the following property of universal hashing.
Lemma 9 (Theorem 3, [13]): Let X ∈ X be a random
variable with distribution PX and Re´nyi entropy (of second
order) R(X) = − log2E[PX(X)]. Let G be a random choice
(according to uniform distribution) of a member of universal
class of hash functions X → {0, 1}r, and let Q = G(X).
Then, we have
H(Q|G) ≥ R(Q|G) ≥ r−log2
(
1 + 2r−R(X)
)
≥ r−
2r−R(X)
ln 2
.
Exploiting the proposed coding scheme, which creates ad-
vantage in favor of Bob over the fading channel, we use the
hash functions described above and obtain the following result.
Theorem 10: For any ǫ, ǫ∗ > 0, let
n = LM N (E [C(Wm)]− ǫ
∗) ,
r = LM N
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]
+
]
− ǫ∗
)
.
Then, for sufficiently large L, M and N , Alice and Bob can
w.h.p. agree on the random variable W ∗ , W¯ (1···L) of length
n over LM fading blocks (i.e., Pr{W ∗ 6= Wˆ ∗} ≤ ǫ, where
Wˆ ∗ denotes the estimate at Bob); and choose K = G(W ∗)
as their secret key (here G is chosen uniformly random from
universal class of hash functions {0, 1}n → {0, 1}r) satisfying
I(K;Y ∗e , G) ≤ ǫ,
where Y ∗e , Y¯
(1···L)
e denotes the Eve’s total received symbols.
Proof:
We repeat the described scheme over LM fading blocks.
Due to the construction above, we have
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m )− ǫ1 ≤
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m |Y¯
(i)
e ) ≤
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m ), (16)
where 1
N
H(V¯
(i)
m ) = [C(W
(i)
m ) − C(W
(i)
e )]+ and ǫ1 → 0 as
N gets large (follows from the fact that conditioning does not
increase entropy and the security of V¯ (i)m ), and
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r |Y¯
(i)
e , V¯
(i)
m ) ≤ ǫ2, (17)
where ǫ2 → 0 as N →∞ (follows from Fano’s inequality).
We now consider the total information accumulation and
leakage. Let W ∗ = W¯ (1···L) , {V¯ (l;m)m , V¯ (l;m)r , ∀l ∈
[1, L], ∀m ∈ [1,M ]} and denote the estimate of it at Bob as
Wˆ ∗. We obtain that, there exist N1,M1, s.t. for any N ≥ N1
and M ≥M1, we have
H(W ∗) ≥ LMN (E [C(Wm)]− ǫ
∗) (18)
Pr{W ∗ 6= Wˆ ∗} ≤ LM2−N
β
, (19)
for some β ∈ (0, 12 ) due to polar coding and the union bound.
Considering Y ∗e , Y¯
(1···L)
e at Eve, we write
H(W ∗|Y ∗e ) =
L∑
l=1
H(W¯ (l)|Y¯
(l)
e )
=
LM∑
i=1
H(V¯ (i)m |Y¯
(i)
e ) +H(V¯
(i)
r |Y¯
(i)
e , V¯
(i)
m ). (20)
Focusing on a particular super block, omitting the index (l)
in (W¯ (l), Y¯ (l)e ), and using (16) and (17) in (20), we obtain
MN (E [[C(Wm)− C(We)]
+]− ǫ4) ≤ H(W¯ |Y¯e)
≤MN
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]
+
]
+ ǫ5
)
, (21)
where ǫ4 and ǫ5 vanishes as M,N get large.
In order to translate H(W ∗|Y ∗e ) to Re´nyi entropy, to use
Lemma 9 in our problem, we resort to typical sequences,
as for a uniform random variable both measures are the
same. Considering (W¯ (1), · · · , W¯ (L), Y¯ (1)e , · · · , Y¯ (L)e ) as L
repetitions of the experiment of super block random variables
(W¯, Y¯e), we define the event T based on typical sets as
follows [16]: Let δ > 0. T = 1, if the sequences w¯(1···L) and
(w¯(1···L), y¯
(1···L)
e ) are δ-typical; and y¯(1···L)e is such that the
probability that (w¯′(1···L), y¯(1···L)e ) is δ-typical is at least 1−δ,
which is taken over w¯′(1···L) according to p(W¯ ′
(1···L)
|y¯
(1···L)
e ).
Otherwise, we set T = 0 and denote δ0 , Pr{T = 0}. Then,
by Lemma 6 of [16], as L→∞
Lδ0 → 0, Lδ → 0, and (22)
R(W¯ (1···L)|Y¯ (1···L)e = y¯
(1···L)
e , T = 1)
≥ L(H(W¯ |Y¯e)− 2δ) + log(1− δ). (23)
We continue as follows.
R(W¯ (1···L)|Y¯
(1···L)
e = y¯
(1···L)
e , T = 1)
≥ L(H(W¯ |Y¯e)− 2δ) + log(1 − δ)
≥ LMN
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]
+
]
− ǫ4
−
2δ
MN
+
log(1 − δ)
LMN
)
= LMN
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]
+
]
− δ∗
)
, (24)
where δ∗ → 0 as M,N → ∞. Thus, for the given ǫ∗, there
exists M2, N2 s.t. for M ≥M2 and N ≥ N2, ǫ
∗
2 ≥ δ
∗
. We let
r = LMN (E [[C(Wm)− C(We)]
+]− ǫ∗) and consider the
following bound.
H(K|Y ∗e , G) ≥ H(K|Y
∗
e , G, T )
(a)
≥ (1− δ0)
∑
y∗e∈Y
∗
e
(
H(K|Y ∗e = y
∗
e , G, T = 1)
P (Y ∗e = y
∗
e |T = 1)
)
(b)
≥ (1 − δ0)
(
r −
2−LMN(ǫ
∗−δ∗)
ln 2
)
, (25)
where in (a) δ0 is s.t. Lδ0 → 0 as L → ∞, (b) is due to
Lemma 9 given above and due to (24) and the choice of r.
Here, for the given ǫ > 0, there exists M3, N3 s.t. for M ≥M3
and N ≥ N3, 2
−LMN( ǫ
∗
2
)
ln 2 ≤
ǫ
2 . Hence, we obtain
I(K;Y ∗e , G) = H(K)−H(K|Y
∗
e , G) (26)
≤ δ0r +
2−LMN(ǫ
∗−δ∗)
ln 2
(27)
(a)
≤ δ0LMN +
2−LMN(
ǫ∗
2 )
ln 2
(28)
(b)
≤ δ0LMN +
ǫ
2
, (29)
where (a) holds if M ≥ M2 and N ≥ N2 and (b) holds if
M ≥M3 and N ≥ N3.
Now, we choose some M ≥ max{M1,M2,M3}. For this
choice of M , we choose sufficiently large L and sufficiently
large N such that N ≥ max{N1, N2, N3} and
δ0LMN ≤
ǫ
2
(30)
LM2−N
β
≤ ǫ, (31)
which holds as δ0L → 0 as L → ∞ in (22). (In fact, due
to [16, Lemma 4 and Lemma 6], for any ǫ′ > 0, we can
take δ0L ≤ ǫ
′
L
as L gets large.) Therefore, for this choice of
L,M,N , we obtain the desired result from (18), (19), (29),
due to (30) and (31):
H(W ∗) ≥ LMN (E [C(Wm)]− ǫ
∗) (32)
Pr{W ∗ 6= Wˆ ∗} ≤ ǫ (33)
I(K;Y ∗e , G) ≤ ǫ (34)
In addition, for this choice of L,M,N , we bound H(K) ≥
r − ǫ due to (25), which shows that the key is approximately
uniform.
Few remarks are now in order.
1) Existing code designs in the literature and the previous
section of this work assume that Eve’s channel is known at
Alice and Bob. In the above scheme, Alice and Bob only
need the statistical knowledge of eavesdropper CSI. Also, the
main channel is not necessarily stronger than the eavesdropper
channel, which is not the case for degraded wiretap settings.
2) The above scheme can be used for the wiretap channel
of Section IV by setting M = 0 to achieve strong secrecy
(assuring arbitrarily small information leakage) instead of the
weak notion (making the leakage rate small). See also [16].
3) The results can be extended to arbitrary binary-input
channels along the same lines, using the result of Sec-
tion IV. In such a setting, the above theorem would be
reformulated with n = LMN(E[I(Wm)] − ǫ∗) and r =
LMN(E[[I(Wm)− I(We)]
+]− ǫ∗). However, the code con-
struction complexity of such channels may not scale as good
as that of the erasure channels [8].
VI. DISCUSSION
In this work, we considered polar coding for binary-input
DMCs with a degraded eavesdropper. We showed that polar
coding can be utilized to achieve non-trivial secrecy rates
these set of channels. The results might be extended to
arbitrary discrete memoryless channels using the techniques
given in [17]. The second focus of this work was the secret
key agreement over fading channels, where we showed that
Alice and Bob can create advantage over Eve by using the
polar coding scheme at each fading block, which is then
exploited with privacy amplification techniques to generate
keys. This result is interesting in the sense that part of the
key agreement protocol is established information theoretically
over fading channels by only requiring statistical knowledge
of eavesdropper CSI at the users.
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